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Abstract 
 In Turkey in the concept of European Union adaptation process, Law 
No.4054 on the Protection of Competition has came into effect in 1994. Then 
in 1997 Turkish Competition Autority has been established. Turkish 
Competition Law is parallel to competition law’s rules of Europen Union 
Agreement. In this concept the actions that are forbidded and has monetary 
penalties are like belows:  
1. Agreements, Concerted Practices, and Decisions Which are 
Restricted Competition 
2. Abuse of Dominant Position 
3. Merger and Acquisitions That Are Causing Dominant Position or 
Strengthening of Dominant Position  
In Turkish Competition Law administrative monetory penalties are being 
applied to the actions which are lessening competition. These penalities can 
be up to 10% of the firm’s revenue according to the action’s importance.  
In this study a general overview will be made for Turkish Competition Law 
and sample cases of Turkish Competition Authority will be considered. 
These cases will be analysed in the perspective of business concerns and 
personal consumers. In the end problems and solution offerings will be 
discussed.  
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Introduction  
 The 4054th Law concerning the Protection of Competition (LCPC) 
within the context of the adoption process to the European Union (UE) went 
into effect in 1994. In the sequel, the Turkish Competition Authority was 
formed in 1997. The LCPC offers parallelism with the competition rules in 
the UE Agreement.31 In this case, the actions prohibited and subjected to 
pecuniary fines with LCPC are listed as follows32: 
1. Agreement Limiting Competition, Concerted Practice and Decisions 
(a4.) 
2. The Abuse of Dominant Position (a6.) 
3. Merger and Acquisition to be such as to Create or Strengthen the 
Dominant Position (a7.) 
 In the Turkish Law, administrative pecuniary fines are applied for 
distortion of competition33. The subject fines can reach up to 10% of the 
endorsements of the concerned undertaking based on the significance of the 
action (LCPC a16.)34. Also, up to 5% of the fine (given to the undertaking or 
undertaking union) is applied as administrative pecuniary fine on the 
undertaking detected with determinant effects of violation or the undertaking 
union administrators or workers. Otherwise, those who suffer from 
competition violation can claim for damages against the concerning 
undertakings (LCPC a.57). In the claim by the sufferers, the judge may rule 
compensation on a threefold rate of the damage caused, the profit made from 
those who caused the damage or the procurable profit on the requisition of 
the sufferers (LCPC a.58). The aim of the threefold sanction besides creating 
a deterrent effect on competition violations is to encourage the sufferers to 
claim for damages35.   
 Since the Turkish Competition Authority has been founded, within 
this 19-year process, it has applied pecuniary fines in many industries. Some 
of these are connected to industries holding an important place in the 
economy. However, pecuniary fines cannot be deterrent enough to prevent 
competition violations. This situation can appear especially when the income 
that could be received from competition violation is higher than the rate of 
the pecuniary fine. At this point, damage actions gain importance. The risk 
of undertakings paying a substantial amount of compensation could have a 
                                                          
31 Güven P., Rekabet Hukuku, Ankara, 2005, p. 35. 
32 Topçuoğlu, M., Rekabeti Kısıtlayan Teşebbüsler Arası İşbirliği Davranışları ve Hukuki 
Sonuçları, Ankara, 2001,  p. 84; Sanlı, K. C., Rekabetin Korunması Hakkındaki Kanunda 
Öngörülen Yasaklayıcı Hükümler ve Bu Hükümlere Aykırı Sözleşme ve Teşebbüs Birliği 
Kararlarının Geçersizliği, Ankara 2000, p. 27. 
33 Topçuoğlu, M., p. 88. 
34 Aslan, İ. Y., Rekabet Hukuku, Bursa, 2005, p. 637. 
35  Şahin, M., Rekabet Hukukunda Tazminat Talepleri, İstanbul 2013, p. 198.  
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deterrent effect on competition violations. However, the restraints of 
sufferers claiming damage decrease this effect. In this study, general 
information on Turkish competition authority will be given and competition 
law applications in terms of undertakings and the problems encountered will 
be mentioned.  
 
Turkish Competition Authority Overview 
 The actions prohibited and subjected to pecuniary fines in LCPC are 
as follows: 
- Agreement Limiting Competition, Concerted Practice and Decisions (a4.) 
- The Abuse of Dominant Position (a6.) 
- The Merger and Acquisition to be such as to Create or Strengthen the 
Dominant Position (a7.) 
 The 4th article of LCPC forbids the agreement, concerted practice and 
associations of undertaking  decisions “aiming to prevent, damage, or 
restrain competition directly or indirectly or to be such as to cause or be able 
to cause this effect”.  
Thus, for 
- Agreements between undertakings 
- Concerted Practices between undertakings and 
- undertaking union decisions 
to be forbidden, it has been resolved that in a certain product and service 
market they need to be activities which aim to  
- Restrain 
- Damage or 
- Limit 
the competition or be such as to cause or be able to cause such an effect36.  
 Here, for an agreement, concerted action or decision to be counted 
incompatible, it should be pointed out that it is definitely unnecessary to be 
applied. In this case, actions not yet applied and therefore not restraining 
actions “aiming to limit competition” will be counted against the Law, it is 
not required to wait and see the effects of this application.  
 After it is indicated that the competition violating agreement, 
concerted action and undertaking union decisions in article 4 of LCPC are 
forbidden, examples have been given regarding in what cases these kinds of 
violations will be in question. Among these are: 
- Determination of Price and other Commercial Provisions 
- Sharing Markets 
- Controlling Supply and Demand 
- Exclusionary Applications 
                                                          
36  İnan, N., Piker, M. B.,  Rekabet Hukuku El Kitabı, 2007, p. 25. 
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- Discriminatory Applications 
- Putting Additional Obligations and Conditions 
 For undertakings found in dominant position as per article 6 of LCPC 
to misuse this power they possess in a way to limit the competition in the 
market is forbidden as per article 6 of LCPC. Therefore, preventing 
undertakings in dominant position from misusing these powers to batten 
upon other undertakings and consumers or pushing them outside of the 
market is demanded. The definition of the phrase “misuse” in article 6 of 
LCPC has not been given37, instead examples of misuse situations that are 
come across most have been given. These are situations such as, 
- Exclusionary Applications 
- Discrimination 
- Setting forth Additional (Abnormal) Obligations 
- Damaging Competition in another Market due to a Dominant 
Position in a Market 
- Limiting Production, Marketing or Technical Progress. 
 At last, in article 7 of LCPC “The Acquisition and Joining to be such 
as to Create or Strengthen the Dominant Position” has been forbidden. The 
type of joining and acquisition processes which can be permitted have been 
arranged in the Declaration issued by the Competition Authority.  
 Not only have the competition damaging actions been indicated in 
LCPC, but the sanctions to be applied due to these actions have also been 
stated. It could be said that in the Turkish Competition Law a binary sanction 
system has been adopted. These are two types such as administrative 
sanctions and private law sanctions.    
 Pecuniary fines are the most important of the administrative 
sanctions. Sanctions applied in some countries such as prison sentence38 and 
prohibition of management39 are not applied in our law.  
 Pecuniary fines have been itemized in article 16 of LCPC. According 
to this, a pecuniary fine of up to 10% of the yearly gross income stated at the 
end of the financial year from the previous year of the final judgement order 
                                                          
37 European Court of Justice, Hoffmann- In the La Roche case has defined misuse as “every 
action that could damage, limit, or prevent competition of a dominant position and could 
provide itself with unjust advantages”. See also Aslan, p. 396. 
38 For example, prison sentences can be given for competition damaging action in the USA. 
For more information, please see Gökşin K., ABD, AB ve Türk Rekabet Hukukunda 
Kartellerle Mücadele, Rekabet Kurumu Uzmanlık Tezi No: 213, Rekabet Kurumu, Ankara, 
2003, p.7, 84.  
39 Prohibition of Management is the manager of the undertakings with competition violating 
actions being disqualified for a certain period of time. For detailed info please see Kortunay 
A., Şahin M., “Rekabet Hukukunda Alternatif Bir Yaptırım: Teşebbüs Yöneticilerinin 
Görevden Uzaklaştırılması (Yöneticilik Yapma Yasağı), Rekabet Hukukunda Güncel 
Gelişmeler Sempozyumu- IX, 6 Mayıs 2011, Kayseri, pp.137-164.  
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is given to the undertakings or the undertaking unions which act against the 
forbidden actions of LCPC. Also, up to 5% of the fine (given to the 
undertaking or undertaking union) is applied as administrative pecuniary fine 
on the undertaking detected with determinant effects of violation or the 
undertaking union administrators or workers.40  
 The private law sanctions that can surface for the reason of 
contradiction to LCPC are “invalidity” and “claim”. According to LCPC 
article 56, every kind of agreement and decision of undertaking unions 
contradictory to article 4 of LCPC is invalid.  
 Otherwise, those who suffer from competition violation can claim for 
damages against the concerning undertakings (LCPC a.57). In the claim by 
the sufferers, the judge may rule compensation on a threefold rate of the 
damage caused, the profit made from those who caused the damage or the 
procurable profit on the requisition of the sufferers (LCPC a.58). The aim of 
the threefold sanction besides creating a deterrent effect on competition 
violations is to encourage the sufferers to claim for damages.   
 
Examples from Applications  
 Since the Turkish Competition Authority has been founded, within 
this 19-year process, it has applied pecuniary fine in many industries. The 
amount of cases in the context of the 4th and 6th articles of the Competition 
Authority between 2011-2014 is 259+283+303+142+163= 1150 fines have 
been given to 52 of them. According to this, the fine rate is around 5%.41 
This state is most importantly due to the applications made to the 
Competition Authority for reasons that are not in the context of LCPC. It is 
possible to say that the fact that the Competition Authority in Turkey does 
not have a deep rooted history (when compared to America and EU 
countries) is an important factor with this situation.  
 Some cases in which pecuniary fine is applied by the Competition 
Authority are related to important industries in the economy and the fines 
given have been in great amounts. For example, in 2008 in the context of the 
misuse of dominant position (about price squeeze), a 12,4 Million TL (about 
7 million Euro) fine was given to Turk Telekom and its subsidiary company 
TT-Net.  
 Likewise, investigations were started for 23 automotive companies in 
2011 in the context of the article regarding Agreement Limiting 
Competition, Concerted Action and Decisions (LCPC a. 4). A total fine of 
                                                          
40 Pecuniary fines as per article 16 of LCPC are not limited to this. Other fines will be 
applied in cases of contradiction to other obligations undertakings are required to fulfill to 
LCPC (for example, giving misleading information at dispensation applications or 
preventing viewing).  
41 Resource: www.rekabet.gov.tr 
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277 Million TL (about 130 million Euro) was given to 15 of these companies 
(for reasons as negotiating about price strategies for the future, negotiating 
about stock, goals, and sales strategies).  
 Again in 2013 within the context of the same article a fine of 1.1 
Billion TL (about 450 million Euro) was given to 12 banks (for reasons of 
determining their interest rates together).  
 A couple of months before the Competition Authority started an 
investigation in order to investigate if insurance companies were in 
agreement/concerted action due to the extreme rise in traffic insurance 
rates42. 
 With statistical data regarding claims for damages due to competition 
violation not being found it is understood through the number of court 
decisions that the number of them are not so many.  
 
Evaluations in terms of Undertakings and Ultimate Consumers 
 The direct and primary aim of the Competition Authority is to 
provide and protect competition order. An efficient competition environment 
before everything causes effectivity in production and resource allocation. 
Also, it encourages production on less cost and technological advancement. 
As a result of this, the possibility of being able to buy quality products and 
service for a cheaper price. Therefore, the welfare of consumers and social 
welfare increases.43 
 Apart from these, the competition order enables the safety of 
opponent and (especially) small undertakings by means of forbidding the 
dominant undertakings from misuse of their economic powers and to 
eliminate the barriers of entering the market. Also, it is known that the 
competitive environment is advantageous in decreasing the inflation.  
 As a result, it could be said that the aim of the competition norms is 
to protect the competition environment by means of the market operators’ 
activities being bound to rules, as well as the ultimate aim being “providing 
financial efficiency” and therefore “maximizing social welfare (therefore 
consumer welfare)”.44      
 Besides heavy fines of up to 10% of yearly gross income of 
undertakings causing competition violation, it is subject that they encounter 
agreements they made being void and receiving a threefold fine. Also, along 
with the “undertaking image against competition order” not showing itself 
directly as financial loss, it could also as an “indirect sanction” they can 
encounter. However, this is the actual problem: In case the income received 
                                                          
42 Resource: www.rekabet.gov.tr 
43 Aslan, p.8. 
44 Gürkaynak, G., Türk Rekabet Hukuku Uygulaması İçin “Hukuk ve İktisat” Perspektifinen 
“Amaç” Tartışması, Ankara 2003, pp. 6-7, Güven, p. 32.  
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due to competition violation is higher than the fine to be applied, 
undertakings will be able to continue violating. In Turkish Law (contrary to 
the USA and many other countries), giving cartels prison sentences is out of 
the question. In this case, the deterrent effects of damage claims should be 
taken advantage of. The threefold fine sanction in the Turkish Law is an 
important instrument. However, because damage claim cases take long, are 
costly, and that the undertakings do not want to damage their relationship 
with other undertakings in the position of the client or supplier it is not a 
method applied to frequently (enough).  
 Competition violations sometimes arise from the ignorance of the 
undertaking managers about competition law. The fact that undertaking 
managers do not have enough information on competition law is not a 
sufficient reason to not give a fine or for the fine to be decreased. For this 
reason, it is important that the managing personnel are informed by 
specialists, and that the undertaking process and decision making 
mechanisms are adapted to competition law. The managing personnel being 
informed by specialists, and the undertaking process and decision making 
mechanisms being adapted to competition law is possible with competition 
compliance programs. In Turkey, especially after heavy fines given to banks, 
the importance of competition compliance programs has come to surface 
once again, and has started to be applied in some big/corporate companies. A 
competition compliance program being applied in an undertaking –on the 
contrary to some countries- has been regulated as a reason for fine reduction 
in the Turkish Competition Authority.  
 Substantially, consumers are the ones who are ultimately damaged by 
competition violations. Along with this, it is a proven fact that consumers 
with damage from competition violation due not want to go in the way of 
damage claims due to their atomized/crystalized damage. Among many 
reasons for this are that proving competition violation is not easy, consumers 
do not want to face the financial and time cost the case will cause, and that 
they do not have the opportunity to open a group or class action case45. 
Earning operability to damage claims is a current problem of the Turkish 
Competition Authority. Applications in other countries such as relieving the 
managers who violated competition from their duty, deduction of fines that 
will be given to undertakings which have paid a fine have started to be 
discussed in the Turkish Doctrine.  
 
 
 
                                                          
45 For detailed information please see Kortunay, A., AB Rekabet Hukuku’nda Tazminat 
Davalarına Yönelik Reform Çalışmaları ve Türk Hukuku Bakımından “De Lege Ferenda” 
Düşünceler, Rekabet Dergisi, C.10, S.1, pp.107-138. 
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Conclusion       
 The aim of the competition norms is to protect the competition 
environment by means of the market operators’ activities being bound to 
rules, as well as the ultimate aim being “providing financial efficiency” and 
therefore “maximizing social welfare (therefore consumer welfare)”. 
 The 4054th Law concerning the Protection of Competition (LCPC) 
went into effect in 1994. The actions prohibited and subjected to pecuniary 
fines with LCPC are listed as follows: 
4. Agreement Limiting Competition, Concerted Practice and Decisions 
(a4.) 
5. The Abuse of Dominant Position (a6.) 
6. The Merger and Acquisition to be such as to Create or Strengthen the 
Dominant Position (a7.) 
 Fines given by the Competition Authority can reach important 
amounts. It is essential that competition compliance programs are applied at 
undertakings in order to avoid these fines. In case the income to be received 
by competition violation is higher than the fine to be given, undertakings will 
be inclined to violation. For this reason, damage claims have an important 
deterrence in preventing competition violation. However, the fact that 
proving competition violation is not easy, consumers do not want to face the 
financial and time cost the case will cause, and that the Turkish Law does not 
have the model to open a group or class action case comes to us as an 
important obstacle. Applications in other countries such as relieving the 
managers who violated competition from their duty, deduction of fines that 
will be given to undertakings which have paid a fine have started to be 
discussed in the Turkish Doctrine. It is evidential that the steps to be 
taken/the innovations to be done will cause important effects either in 
undertaking management policy or in consumer welfare.  
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